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BUILDING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE 
IN SMALL STATES 
Paul Sutton 
Abstract. The issue of" good governance" has been at the centre of 
the development debate for more than ten years. It is still a contested 
term with a high normative content. Nevertheless there is a broad 
measure of agreement on what might be termed essential elements 
such as open, transparent and accountable government; efficient, 
effective and responsive administration; respect for human rights 
and the rule of law. Recently, good governance has been associated 
with economic resilience building, particularly for small states, 
which are very highly exposed to external shocks. This chapter 
argues that one of the characteristics of small states is that everything 
is interconnected in ways it is not in larger countries. This 
interconnectedness must be at the heart of policy to improve 
resilience and in turn demands a very broad brush policy approach 
to service the very special needs of small states. 
1. Introduction 
The issue of" good governance" has been at the centre of the development 
debate for more than ten years. It is still a contested term with a high 
normative content. Nevertheless there is a broad measure of agreement 
on what might be termed essential elements such as open, transparent 
and accountable government (often defined as liberal democracy); 
efficient, effective and responsive administration; respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. 
Recently, good governance has been associated with economic resilience 
building, particularly for small states, which are very highly exposed to 
external shocks. In a recent conference, the promotion of good 
governance in the public and private sector of small states was considered 
to be a major element of an integrated approach to build resilience 
(Islands and Small States Institute, 2006: paragraphs 4 and 11). 
This chapter argues that the concept of good governance for small states 
needs to be further researched in order to associate it with the resilience 
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building of these states (see Appendix 1 for a list of small states). The 
section that follows briefly examines the concept of good governance 
and notes its link to improved economic development. The third section 
reviews the governance record in small states using the World Bank 
governance indicators. It identifies strengths and weaknesses and points 
to the need for a more targeted approach focused on regions and very 
small size. The fourth section examines the two dimensions of 
governance in which small states appear to be weakest-effective 
government and regulatory quality-identifying some policies that have 
been recommended to improve performance and some difficulties in 
their application and measurement. The fifth section looks at the concept 
of economic resilience and good governance in general , raising some 
issues which need to be further explored to understand the contribution 
good governance can make to building resilience. The sixth section 
concludes the chapter with some proposals for a research and policy 
agenda in connection with the governance of small states. 
2. The Concept of Good Governance 
One of the more important and recent elaborations of the concept of 
governance is the work of Hyden and Court (2002) and Hyden et al. 
(2005). Their approach to governance is very broad defining it as "the 
formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate 
the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and social 
actors interact to make decisions" (Hyden and Court, 2002: 13). This 
definition treats governance as a process and an activity which includes 
government but is much wider than that. Six functional areas of 
governance are identified by Hyden and Court (2002: 16-22): 
1. civil society: where citizens raise and become aware of political issues; 
2. political society: combining societal interests into policy proposals; 
3. government: where policies are made by governmental institutions; 
4. bureaucracy: where policies are administered and implemented; 
5. economic society: the way state and market interact to promote 
development; and 
6. the judicial system: where disputes and conflicts are resolved. 
According to Hyden and Court (2002: 25), good governance appears in a 
"series of basic principles that reflect the emerging global consensus of 
what should, and could, constitute good governance." These are defined 
as follows, with the presumption that the more there is, the better it is: 
• Participation: the degree of involvement and ownership by affected 
stakeholders; 
• Decency: the degree to which the formation and stewardship of rules 
are undertaken without harm or humiliation to the people; 
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" fairness: the degree to which rules apply equally to everyone in society; 
• accountability: the degree to which public officials, elected as well 
appointed, are responsible for their actions and are responsive to public 
demands; 
" transparency: the degree to which decisions made by public officials are 
clear and open to scrutiny by citizens or their representatives; 
• efficiency: the degree to which rules facilitate speedy and timely decision-
making. 
These elements are combined with the six functional areas to yield an 
analytic framework on two axis of 36 boxes which locate the core concerns 
of governance and act as templates to gather evidence on the performance 
of governance in any one or more states. This framework is reproduced 
as Table 1. The framework is useful in quickly identifying key issues and 
in demonstrating the inevitable complexity of building "good 
governance". Of note is that Hyden and his associates find that, in the 16 
countries surveyed (none of which were small states), some "boxes" matter 
more than others. For example, in the civil society area: freedom of 
expression and assembly; in the political society area: free and fair elections; 
in government: civil-military relations; in bureaucracy: transparency and 
accountability; in economic society: absence of corruption; and in the 
judiciary: impartial judgement (ODI, 2005: paragraph 35). 
P1inciple/ 
Arena 
Civil Society 
Political Society 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
Economic 
Society 
Judiciary 
Table 1 
Governance Fundamentals 
Based on Political Arenas and Key Principles 
Participation Fairness Decency Accountability Transparency 
Freedom of S:xiety free from Freedom of Respect of Freedom of the 
association discrimirmtion expression governing rules media 
Legislature Policy reflects Peaceful Legislators Transparency of 
representative public competition for accountable to political parties 
of society preferences political power public 
Intra- Adequate Personal Sxurity forces Government 
governmental standard of security of sulxirdinate:! lo provides accurate 
consultation living citizens civilian govemrncnt information 
Higher civil Equal access to Civil servants Civil servants Clear decision-
servants' public services n:sproful accountable for making process 
participation in 
towardsciti7....ens their actions 
policy-making 
Consultation Regulations Government's Regulating private Transparency in 
with the private equally respect for sector in the economic policy 
sector applied property rights public interest 
Consultative Equal access to Human rights Judicial Clarity in 
processes of justice for all incorporated in officers held administering 
conflict resolution citizens national practice accountable justice 
Source: ODI (2006) 
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Input in policy 
making 
Legislative 
function affecting 
policy 
Best use of 
available 
resources 
Merit-based 
system for 
recruitment 
Interventions 
free from 
corruption 
Efficiency of the 
judicial system 
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At the same time as there is growing consensus on the essential elements 
of good governance there is also a growing understanding that the 
concepts and principles of governance /1 make no sense without adequate 
contextual references. The particular conditions of each country provide 
both constraints and opportunities to improve governance" (ODI, 2006). 
In practice, this has meant an approach to good governance that 
increasingly begins from the existing realities of the state (or region) 
and then builds appropriate programmes in accordance with whether 
the state is a failed state, or one with pronounced personal rule, or is 
institutionalised minimally, or whatever (Grindle, 2005). In the case of 
small states as a specific group this can prove difficult because of the 
wide range of variation within them. 
Some work on the governance of small states has been done for the South 
Pacific region and, to a lesser extent, for the Caribbean region. But none 
of it has been brought together in any single study which distinctively 
focuses on small states. Nevertheless, what is apparent from the literature 
on small states is that high levels of democracy prevail in many of them 
along with reasonably good standards of public administration when 
compared to larger developing countries (see for example Anckar, 2004). 
This positive record, when combined with small size and mostly middle-
income status, means they cause no major problems and so can safely 
be overlooked-not only by the various international organisations and 
donors, but also by much of the academic community. 
This viewpoint, however, is too complacent. Small states may have 
serious problems in promoting or maintaining good governance. This 
was explicitly recognised in a CARICOM submission to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States 
when it argued: 
11 the cost of poor governance in a small society is very large, 
given the extreme difficulty in recovering from the 
consequences of inappropriate policies and practices 
sustained over a very long period. There is thus a clear need 
to build a national consensus on objectives; a clear need for 
a national appreciation for the ease with which the system 
can go off track, as a result of both domestic and external 
shocks; and a broad acceptance that the prospects for every 
individual are intimately bound up with the future of the 
community as a whole" (CARICOM 2000). 
More recently, comments relating to the consultation exercise undertaken 
in 2006 in connection with the Report to review that small states' agenda 
(Briguglio, Persaud and Stern, 2006: Annex I) included the following 
"several senior officials felt that good governance was the most important 
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factor" and "several governments, most notably in the Pacific, 
highlighted governance as their major development challenge". The issue 
of securing good governance in small states is thus not a minor 
consideration but, as with many larger states, a major preoccupation in 
the search for development and greater resilience. 
3. Good Governance in Small States: An Overview 
The development of indicators to measure "good governance" is in its 
infancy. There is much controversy and several competing systems 
(Grindle, 2005). The one chosen here is that developed by the World 
Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2007). There are two reasons for doing so. The 
first is that it covers the largest number of small states. Second, its various 
dimensions correspond to some extent to the six functional areas reported 
in the previous section. 
These six aspects of governance are: 
• voice and accountability: measuring the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well 
as freedom of expression, association, and a free media. 
• political stability and absence of violence: measuring perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
• government effectiveness: measuring the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. 
• regulatory quality: measuring the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
• rule of law: measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
• control of corruption: measuring the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "state capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
The data cover 212 countries for the year 2006. The authors of the index 
are at pains to point out that much of it is subjective and subject to 
significant qualification regarding its findings. Nevertheless, it can 
provide a contemporary" snapshot" of governance in small states which 
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allows some patterns to be identified even if individual features, as 
reflected in the scores for each of the six dimensions, "remain a rather 
blunt instrument for specific policy advice at the country level" 
(Kaufmann et al., 2005: 42). 
The basic data on the six dimensions are presented as Appendix 2. The 
measure used is that of" percentile rank" which indicates the percentage 
of countries that rate below the selected country (subject to margin of 
error). Higher values therefore imply better governance ratings. Full data 
sets over the six variables are reported for 46 of the 50 states listed in 
Appendix 1. 
Using as a dividing line the average world total for each of the six 
indicators, Appendix 2 shows 29 states (33 if the 4 with incomplete data 
are included) as having a positive record of governance (above the 
average) while 15 have a negative record (below average). Two states 
are "middling" with 3 negative and 3 positive indicators. The positive 
categories are primarily composed of European, Asian and Caribbean 
states. The latter are particularly worthy of note, with 9 Caribbean states 
so identified as against one "middling" (Suriname) and two negative 
(Belize and Guyana). This confirms the reputation the Caribbean enjoys 
of being the most democratic region in the developing world (its regional 
indicators are above those of all regions except the OECD' s). By contrast, 
sub-Saharan African states dominate the negative category with only 3 
in the positive category (Mauritius, Cape Verde and Seychelles). At the 
same time, however, 6 states are above the regional average (with 3 below 
and 2 middling) for sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting small African states 
may be better governed than larger ones. 
The most varied experience is to be found among the Pacific Island states 
with 7 in the positive category, 1 "middling" and 3 negative. While no 
calculation has been done to see if this record for small states is better 
than that for larger states, it would appear to confirm evidence from 
elsewhere in the World Bank as reported in their Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments that "small states" overall policy and 
institutional performance has been at least as strong as that of larger 
countries" (Briguglio, Persaud and Stern., 2006: paragraph 76). 
Of even greater note is that the smaller the state, the better the record. 
Dividing the countries by percentile rank on population levels into four 
groups (including the 4 with incomplete data) the first quartile (states 
with a population above 750,000) shows 6 above average, 6 below 
average, and 1 middling; the second quartile (population above 320,000) 
6 above average, 5 below, 1 middling; the third quartile (population 
above 100,000) 9 above average, 3 below; and the fourth quartile 
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(population 100,000 and below) 12 above average and 1 below. While 
some of this no doubt can be explained by the relatively greater number 
of African countries in the first two quartiles and of Caribbean and 
European in the last two quartiles it does raise some interesting questions 
of size as a "threshold" in securing good governance. 
Lastly, there is the question of economic development. Better governance 
is positively associated with improved economic performance as 
measured by per-capita income (Grindle, 2005: 4). Taking US$4000 per-
capita income as the dividing line, 23 of the 25 small states with incomes 
above this record 4 or more positive indicators (or 3 in the case of those 
with incomplete data) while 13 small states with incomes below it record 
4 or more negative indicators. Among the negative records, only two 
states (Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) have an income above US$4000 
per capita. At the same time, 10 of the small states with positive records 
have per-capita incomes below US$4000 (in the highest category of only 
positive indicators, there are 15 states with incomes above US$4000 and 
3 with incomes below this figure). In general, the association of higher 
per-capita income and good governance appears supported in small 
states with increasing levels of income associated with increasing levels 
of good governance. 
These broad preliminary findings suggest the utility of disaggregating 
small states by region in line with the recommendation in the earlier 
section on the importance of context, as shown in Table 2. There also 
appears to be some merit in raising distinctions in size and per-capita 
income within small states. 
Table 2 
Small States Classified by Region 
Africa Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles, Swaziland. 
Asia Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Maldives, Qatar, Timor Leste. 
Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Europe Andorra, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino. 
Pacific Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 
(Federated States), Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
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Voice and accountability. Of 50 small states, 34 have above-average global 
ratings and 16 below. All the Caribbean states have higher ratings, as 
do 9 of the 10 European and 9 of the 11 Pacific states. Poorer than 
average global ratings are recorded for 7 out of 11 African and for all 
the Asian states. In terms of population it clearly pays to be smaller. 
Twenty-four of the above-average states are in the two lowest quartiles 
(population below 320,000) and only one state (Tonga) has lower than 
average global ratings. By contrast, 15 of the below-average states are 
in the upper two quartiles. It also pays to be wealthier. Twenty of the 
above-average states are in the two highest quartiles (per-capita income 
above US$4000) although there are 14 states with above-average ratings 
in the lowest quartiles, underlining the generally good ratings in this 
dimension. 
Political stability and violence. Twelve of the 50 states have lower-than-
average ratings and 38 higher than average ratings. Of the 12 states 
with lower ratings, 6 are African, 4 Caribbean and 2 Asian. All Pacific 
and European states have higher ratings. In this dimension, smallness 
brings benefits. All states (28 in total) with a population below 446,000 
have above-average global ratings. These figures could, of course, be 
distorted, by under-reporting the level of instability and violence. 
Carment et al. (2006) raise this possibility but they also find, as others 
have done before them, that small island developing states report lower 
levels of conflict (or alternatively, that conflict may take other forms). 
Higher per-capita income states (21 out of 25 have income per capita 
above US$4000) also tend to have lower levels of political instability 
and violence. 
Government effectiveness. Twenty-nine of the 50 states have higher-than-
average ratings and 21, below average. The greatest proportion of above-
average states is to be found among Caribbean (11), Asian (5) and European 
(8) states. The greatest proportions of below average are in Pacific (9) and 
African states (8). The more even balance of those above and below average 
compared to the two previous governance dimensions is also found in 
the percentile figures. In the first two quartiles, 15 are above average and 
10 below, while in the lower two quartiles, 14 are above average and 11 
below. This last set of figures is perhaps a little surprising since one of the 
strongest arguments in the literature on small states relates to returns of 
scale in the provision of public services, where the smaller you are, the 
greater the costs (and by implication, the greater the inefficiencies and/ or 
lack of services). Lastly, there is a clear relation between income and 
government effectiveness. Twenty of the above-average states have 
incomes over US$4000while16 of the below average have incomes below 
this figure, with 10 out of 13 of them in the bottom quartile (incomes below 
US$2170 per capita). 
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Regulatory quality. Twenty-three of the reported 46 small states have 
higher than average ratings and 23 are below average. Proportionately 
the greatest number of those with below-average ratings is to be found 
in Africa (9) and the Pacific (7) with Asia and the Caribbean recording 2 
each. All European ratings except one are above average. In terms of 
population, the greatest number of below average (15) are in the two 
upper quartiles and the greatest number of above average (13) in the 
lowest two quartiles. This may reflect the need for the smallest countries 
to be more open. Income also appears to be very relevant. The 17 states 
with the highest per-capita incomes (above US$8650) all have positive 
ratings while the 14 poorest states (per-capita income below US$2170) 
all have negative ratings. This suggests capacity is very important in 
this dimension. 
Rule of law. Thirty-five states have higher-than-average ratings and 15 are 
below average. Asia and Europe have one below-average country, the 
Pacific 2, the Caribbean 3, and Africa 8. The importance of being small 
again appears to be a consideration. Twenty-three of the countries with 
higher than average ratings lie in the lowest 2 quartiles (population below 
330,000) while 13 of those with lower than average ratings are in the two 
highest quartiles. On this measure very small states have a very good 
record. Income again also matters. Twenty-two countries with higher than 
average ratings lie in the top 2 quartiles (income above US$4000) while 12 
with below-average ratings are in the lowest 2 quartiles. 
Control of corruption. Of the 46 small states recorded, 28 have higher than 
average ratings and 17 lower-than-average ratings, with one state 
(Micronesia) scoring exactly 50 percent. The lower than average ratings 
are concentrated in the African states (8) and the Pacific states (4), with 
two each for Asia and the Caribbean. All reported European countries 
with one exception have higher than average ratings as do 10 Caribbean 
states and 4 Asian states. Size does not appear to make too much 
difference with 25 states in the first two quartiles reporting 12 above 
average and 13 below-average ratings. The lowest two quartiles report 
a better record with 16 states above average, 4 below, and one at 50 
percent. Higher per-capita income states also have a better record with 
19 states above average in the top two quartiles (21 states) but only 9 in 
the bottom two quartiles (25 states). All states with a per-capita income 
above US$8250 have a positive record. 
This analysis suggests the importance of targeting resilience building in 
small states according to circumstance. In terms of small states as a group 
the rank order of success is as follows: 
1. political stability/ absence of violence (76 percent above average); 
2. rule of law (70 percent above average); 
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3. voice and accountability (68 percent above average); 
4. control of corruption (62 percent above average); 
5. government effectiveness (58 percent above average); 
6. regulatory quality (50 percent above average). 
This list indicates that there are areas where improvement in governance 
is called for, in order to build economic resilience. Priority should be 
given logically in the reverse order i.e., beginning with measures to 
improve regulatory quality followed by government effectiveness. 
At the same time, the regional analysis points to the need for assisting 
small states in improving their governance. 
Africa, and more especially mainland Africa, is the region in need of the 
greatest improvement in governance in virtually every dimension. In 
this respect it is tempting to conclude that African small states share 
much the same predicament as larger African states, and so do not need 
assistance as small states but essentially as African states. 
The Pacific also needs help as a region to build government effectiveness, 
improve regulatory quality and control corruption. 
The other regions either do not need help at all (Europe with the 
exception of Montenegro) or, in the case of Asia and the Caribbean, 
specific help to particular states (e.g., Timor Leste and Guyana) or specific 
governance dimensions, in the context of the overall governance 
performance of the state (e.g., Bhutan, Belize and Suriname). 
There may be some merit in considering distinctions in terms of size. In 
three of the dimensions - voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, and the rule of law - the smaller states seem to 
perform better. This is also true marginally in terms of regulatory quality. 
It is not entirely clear at what level these special advantages "kick in" 
but once the population gets above 300,000 (or 400,000) the benefits of 
being very small appear to diminish. This raises the question as to 
whether the particular category of "microstate", which was much 
discussed in the 1970s and early 1980s but which was then dropped, 
should once again be adopted to aid analysis and policy, at least as far 
as the analysis of governance is concerned. 
Lastly, higher per-capita income would seem to be related to those 
governance indicators in respect of voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, the rule of law and control of corruption. 
This is not particularly surprising, but one may ask why this is not the 
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case for governmental effectiveness and, more marginally, regulatory 
quality? In both these dimensions the general supposition would be that 
more wealthy states can afford better government and are familiar with 
better regulation. This in itself then raises further questions about the 
appropriate form of public administration/ management in small states 
and whether regulation needs to be tailored to specific circumstances. 
4. Towards More Effective Government and Better Regulation 
The above overview indicates that the immediate general priority for 
small states is building more effective government and securing better 
regulation. Neither of these themes is new. The former has been much 
discussed over the years within the specialist public administration 
literature on small states (Baker, 1992) while the latter has become an 
important feature for all states as a result of the dominant neo-liberal 
development paradigm and the rapid spread of globalisation. Both 
themes were also central preoccupations of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States in 2000, where 
they appeared as recommendations for strengthening capacity. These 
covered the actions of both the public and the private sector, with an 
emphasis "on action that the public sector can take, both to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in providing public services, and to provide 
an environment that encourages stronger private sector development" 
(Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 2000: 80). 
Improving the Public Sector 
The literature on small states identifies four behavioural features (Sutton, 
2006: 13-15) which shapes the performance of the public service: 
Exaggerated personalism. The public service is usually strongly influenced 
by dominant personalities (ministers and senior public officials) and open 
to personal favour (and patronage) in its day-to-day operations; 
Limited resources. There may be multiple portfolios among senior staff leading 
to inappropriate training and career progression along with an inability to 
provide a full range of public services except at a relatively high cost; 
Inadequate service delivery. This occurs as a result of high costs of 
infrastructure and low motivation within the public sector among 
middle-level management and lower-level employees; and 
Relatively high degree of dependence on foreign consultants. The dependence 
on foreign management consultants often leads to these consultants 
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promoting and applying "scale-insensitive" management practices, 
supported by donors and international organisations employing 
expatriate specialists on limited contracts to staff posts for which locals 
are not qualified. 
The dominant discourse is thus clearly focused on the differences that 
scale imposes on small states, particularly the microstates. However, 
while these sorts of constraints are identified and acknowledged in the 
literature on small states, they are rarely translated into dedicated 
programmes for improving public administration in small states. The 
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force Report (2000) and 
the Review of the Small States Agenda (Briguglio, Persaud and Stern, 2006) 
both bear this out. The former offers only very general (if nevertheless 
worthy) practical advice such as the need to establish a website to share 
good practice, to involve donors and regional organisations in specific 
programmes, and to secure political commitment for capacity building. 
In comparison to the other sections in the Report specific policy 
recommendation is relatively weak. The same goes for the recently 
concluded Review. It urges public-sector reform, regional initiatives and 
emerging opportunities for outsourcing government services. The latter 
are an important consideration. However, such outsourcing requires not 
only expensive infrastructure and reasonable competencies in ICT, but 
also a vibrant private sector to contract for the work. One wonders 
whether this really exists in the very small and poorer developing states. 
In short, have the distinctive difficulties of public service provision in 
small states really been acknowledged in policy recommendation to 
date? Similarly, do small states need specific programmes to build 
government effectiveness that are different from those of larger states, 
and if so how and what? 
A recent study on public-sector reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
over the last ten years (Sutton, 2006) suggests that building an efficient 
and effective public service is no easy task. The record in the region 
shows many setbacks and only partial, and increasingly limited, success. 
The adoption of ideas and good practice elsewhere, in the form of "new 
public management" paradigms and programmes have not 
fundamentally changed the character of the public sector which in most 
places remains essentially unreformed. Much the same apparently goes 
for the Pacific region (Mellor and Jabes, 2004). 
The inevitable conclusion from these reflections is that improvements 
in governmental effectiveness leading to better governance will take 
many years to achieve. There also needs to be some new thinking on the 
problems involved, beginning with a proper understanding of how the 
public sector works (or does not) in small states. 
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Encouraging the Private Sector 
The need for the state to play a /1 catalytic and facilitating role, 
encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and 
individuals" has been a staple of the development literature since it was 
"rediscovered" in the World Development Report 1997. In the Task Force 
Report 2000 it made an appearance in the sections on trade, globalisation 
and capacity building where it focused respectively on trade policy and 
macroeconomic management; new opportunities in service provision, 
which meant more strategic action in the public sector in support of a 
dynamic private sector; and actions to support business through tax 
reforms, an improved regulatory environment, and encouragement of 
business associations and their various activities. 
Much of this has been re-emphasised in the 2006 Review of the Small States 
Agenda (Briguglio, Persaud and Stern., 2006) particularly the need for 
small states to implement "a service-based and knowledge-based 
development paradigm" and to develop the private sector as /1 the engine 
of growth and development". While this involves the state in a variety 
of policy dimensions, in respect of private-sector development the two 
key policy elements have been competition policy and regulatory policy, 
both of which feature prominently in the calculation of the World Bank 
governance indicator on /1 regulatory quality". 
In their edited book on Competitiveness Strategies for Small States (Briguglio 
et al. 2004: 27) conclude that "the main thrust of the studies ... is that 
competitiveness is essential for the economic success of small states, 
possibly much more so than is the case for larger states, due to their 
high degree of economic openness". The policies they recommend to 
improve international competitiveness call for government initiatives 
across a range of activities including delivering sound macroeconomic 
management, designing appropriate institutions to promote 
competitiveness, encouraging education and investment in human 
capital, supporting innovation and attitudinal change, fostering social 
cohesion, and developing infrastructure. 
These are very demanding prerequisites for some small states and, even 
when some aspects of them can be delivered, there is no guarantee that 
success will follow. For example, the consultations following the 
publication of the 2006 Review of the Small States Agenda point to the belief 
of some officials that "while they had enacted "private sector friendly" 
policy regimes they were, in many cases, still waiting to see the 
investment response" (Briguglio et al., 2006: Annex I). The Review also 
highlighted the relatively high costs of doing business in small states. 
Some of this relates to competition policy within small states to reduce 
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market abuse by monopolies and oligopolies. While this is no doubt a 
sound ambition, the very limited size of the market can render traditional 
approaches to competition policy redundant, to which there is a further 
consideration. In countries in which not only markets and firms are small, 
but the country is being increasingly opened to large international 
competitors, "local" firms (whether monopolies or not) will find it 
difficult to achieve competitive advantage. 
This has recently been highlighted by Richard Bernal (2006) who has 
described most firms in CARICOM as "nano-firms" whose small size 
(less than 50 firms in CARI COM exceed the conventional definition of 
small firms as one with 500 employees or more) put them at a distinct 
disadvantage compared to those in Canada, the EU and the US which 
will be the first to benefit from the further opening of the region's 
markets. It follows that /1 special measures" need to be put in place to 
encourage the competitiveness of CARI COM firms at national, regional 
and international levels and, by inference, in other small states. 
The other issue is an increase in regulatory capacity. As with 
competition policy, this has both an external and an internal dimension. 
The 2006 Review focuses in particular on developments in the financial 
regulatory environment which have sought to impose stringent 
regulatory and supervisory standards on the operations of offshore 
financial centres, many of which are found in small states. The 
introduction of these standards without consultation with small states 
led to disputes and ultimately to some concessions by the international 
organisations which sought to introduce them. The threat of future 
action, however, has not been removed and while small states have 
managed to secure some assistance for better regulation and 
supervision, as well as a voice in the development of overall policy, 
the burden of regulation remains high. It is therefore easy for small 
states to suddenly find themselves deficient in meeting externally-
imposed standards, which in turn affects their chances of meeting the 
criteria of good governance in this area. 
The 2006 review also touches on the need to develop effective domestic 
regulatory institutions and a /1 sound and predictable" regulatory 
environment. In essence, this means the development of institutions 
capable of managing technically-complex policy issues, and the presence 
of controls to prevent the arbitrary exercise of discretion. These again 
impose clem;:mrlin3 st;mrlnrrls on sm11Jl stRtPs which m11y not have the 
level of expertise "in-house" to provide the former and can often be 
faced with substantial opposition in imposing the latter, as the studies 
of resistance to developing /1 modern" forms of property rights in the 
South Pacific by Jayaraman (2004) and Reddy (2004) demonstrate. 
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One way to proceed favoured in both the 2000 Task Force Report and the 
2006 Review is through developing an appropriate regional regulatory 
approach in small states. The experience of the Eastern Caribbean 
Telecommunications Authority in developing "fairer competition" and 
"lower pricing" is commended in both. This is what might be described 
as a "modern expression" of long-standing regional co-operation in 
functional areas in the Caribbean such as meteorology and school 
examinations. However, such areas have developed only slowly and with 
much difficulty and while globalisation may have increased the areas of 
potential co-operation it does not mean that political action is any more 
disposed toward them. There is also the issue of how such "shared" 
measures are reported in the good governance indices: as national (when 
the blame for inaction may really lie at the regional level) or as regional-
in which case there is the need to develop regional indicators (as discussed 
in the debate on good governance in the EU). 
In short, on regulatory capacity, the above section endorses the view by 
Downes (2006: 127) that" a pragmatic approach to market reforms should 
be adopted in [small developing countries] given their special 
characteristics". At one level this does recognise the importance of small 
states, qua small states, but at another it also demands recognition of 
small states in a regional context and their developmental levels. With 
regard to relative size, it recognises that small states share similar 
characteristics but are also different. In many ways this is a statement of 
the obvious, but it does raise difficulties in developing specific policies 
(as against general statements of development orthodoxy) to improve 
government so as to ensure effectiveness and encourage private sector 
development through a supportive regulatory environment. The 
question then arises of what form of intervention at what level and how? 
Equally, it raises important issues as to what, in the construction of any 
index, should be measured and how. 
5. Resilience and Good Governance 
In his recent article on" regime choices in microstates" (defined as states 
with a population below one million), Anckar (2004: 115) makes several 
interesting observations. First, he finds that colonial heritage is "an 
important determinant of regime choice" with the vast majority of 
microstates introducing similar regimes to those prevailing in their 
respective former colonising power. Since these powers were much 
larger, the small size o± the new state as compared to the ±armer 
colonising power was not an issue in regime choice. Second, he notes 
the relative durability of regime type, with the regime prevailing today 
likely to be the same as that adopted at independence - a fealure that 
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was earlier identified in Sutton (1987: 8-12) as "institutional fidelity" in 
small states. Since change is infrequent and when it does occur it is in no 
particular direction as regards regime type, Anckar (2004: 216) finds there 
is no specific /1 small-state constitutional strategy that overrides the link to 
different metropolitan powers", implying that small size in itself does 
not, over time, tend towards a specific regime type. Third, since in the 
majority of cases, these states were former British colonies or protectorates, 
there is a dominance of parliamentary regimes (20 out of 36 cases), followed 
by absolute regimes (9 cases), presidential regimes (6 cases) and semi-
presidential (1 case). This is distinctive from the global total, where only a 
quarter of the world have parliamentary regimes, just over one-third 
presidential regimes and just under one-third absolute regimes. It is also 
very provident for microstates, he argues, since "the scholarly literature 
on regimes, empirical evidence and most writers appear to favour the 
parliamentary model, which is found to foster a greater ability to rule" 
leaving microstates "well equipped in terms of institutional structure for 
managing political life and political affairs" (Anckar, 2004: 214). 
These observations raise interesting questions. To begin with, does size 
matter in good governance? Anckar (2004) and others have shown a 
clear positive relationship between small size and democracy. But how 
far should this be taken when the wider concerns of governance, as 
proxied by regime choice, are considered? If a choice is to be made, 
should it be towards a parliamentary model, either to improve it or to 
better realise its benefits? And in either case, should it be undertaken at 
all given that there is a strong option in favour of the status quo - again, 
this feature was identified earlier in small states as "pragmatic 
conservatism" (Sutton, 1987: 18-19). Since we do not have clear-cut 
answers to these sorts of questions, the specification of any particular 
programme or any particular regime to encourage good governance (and 
build resilience) in small states, qua small states, is fraught with difficulty. 
Adding to all this is the issue of complexity set out in Table 1. The 36 
boxes identify potential interventions to build good governance, but 
provide no direction. Hyden and Court (2002) and Hyden et al. (2005) do 
suggest some priorities, but whether these are appropriate for small states 
is a matter of debate. For example, their finding in the government arena 
that civil-military relations are very important can be of relevance to some 
small states (Fiji immediately springs to mind) but for many, it is irrelevant 
since they do not have military forces as usually defined (Bartrnann, 2002). 
Again, in the civil society arena, the importance of freedom of expression 
and assembly is a matter of urgency in some small states (most notably 
Equatorial Guinea) but for many it is already secured, as their excellent 
record on democracy demonstrates. 
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The question quite simply is therefore-where to begin? Or even whether 
to begin at all? I raise this last question because, in their discussion of 
the Resilience Index, Briguglio et al. (2006) note that the highest 
correlation scores relate to 11 good governance and social development" 
and 11 good governance and market efficiency" raising questions "as to 
whether or not the good governance index is redundant". They choose 
to retain it on the grounds that the correlation was 11not unduly high" 
but given the sort of questions I have just posed, this could be 
problematic, particularly if the intention is to build a robust index which 
will withstand academic and donor challenge and point to areas where 
resilience needs to be built. 
While these considerations point to a case to leave good governance out 
of any index until we have better understanding, there is also the point I 
raised in my opening paragraph that at the heart of "nurtured resilience" 
is 11 good governance" (or at least governance). So it is difficult to see how 
it can be ignored. In this case, we have to be clear about what we mean by 
11 governance", and "good governance" and about its purpose. The 
components adopted in the construction of the Resilience Index proposed 
by Briguglio et al. (2006: 275) emphasise it in relation to the economic 
system as represented by 11 issues such as rule of law and property rights" 
but then go on to use as one of its five components "political system and 
the integrity of the system" which is very broad gauged and normative in 
its determination. It would, perhaps, be better to be more tightly focused 
on "legal" criteria functional to the development of the economic system 
(in this case, a capitalist system, though this in itself might raise objection). 
At the same time, such a focus might also be too narrow. 
When the debate on good governance was first introduced the World 
Bank had a much narrower view of its essential elements than it does 
today. Similarly, donors and international organisations now have a 
much more comprehensive view than they once had and a greater 
conviction that it really matters for development. So good governance 
will have to be acknowledged and treated as all-round rather than in a 
specific limited form. 
In sum, there is the need to clarify what good governance means to 
resilience building in small states, and how to measure it to construct a 
resilience index. There are a lot of assumptions and a lot of generalisation 
but very few robust conclusions germane to small states, qua small states. 
As ever, small states remain a comparatively under-researched area in 
social science and the current state of knowledge about their political 
behaviour leaves much to be desired. There is no alternative but to go 
forward using what little we know about small states, but we must be 
aware of just how little it is. 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter argues that if we are to understand good governance in 
small states, then more work must be done on them as small states. 
First of all, it is important to come forward with a definition of small 
states. The option of JI self definition" is a convenient way of evading 
difficult political issues, but are Singapore and Papua New Guinea really 
small states? Or Lesotho and Jamaica for that matter? 
Second, having defined a small state, we need to know whether they 
really are that different from large states. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat/World Bank Task Force Report (2000) argued they were-
as had the earlier Commonwealth Secretariat reports (1985,1997) on small 
states. But in none of these publications is there compelling evidence in 
the governance sphere that this is the case, except in a very general way. 
True, the specific problems of public administration in small states are 
mentioned, but the remedies offered are not unique to small states but 
drawn largely from the literature on capacity building in developing 
states. In itself, it may be argued, this is all that is needed since most 
small states are developing states and policy can be adapted to suit their 
specific experiences. This viewpoint may have some validity, but the 
literature (and the present author's experience of 40 years of work and 
study in small states) points to unique characteristics in small states 
which are likely to require unique and customised solutions. Why, 
otherwise, should all reports on them raise the ritual incantation that 
they should learn from one another (the spread of good practice)? 
Finally, we have to determine which policy works and why? This is 
both a research and an action programme. Research, because we do not 
have enough knowledge of governance in small states to confidently 
predict the outcomes of any programmes that are attempted. This applies 
across a raft of measures, beginning with a review of basic data such as 
those collected by the World Bank for their governance indicators, where 
too often for small states, there is only one (subjective) source for key 
elements of an indicator. Action is also needed, because small states still 
do not figure on the programmes of international agencies as JI small 
states" as prominently as they should, given their inherent special 
characteristics, including economic vulnerability. 
It is true that small states have, over many years, been given attention in 
the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat and, more recently, the World 
Bank. But the agenda adopted by both has been excessively economics-
oriented and good governance has been treated as a means to an end in 
order to promote economic development, and not as a desirable objective 
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in its own right. One of the characteristics of small states is that 
everything is interconnected in ways it is not in larger countries. This 
interconnectedness must be at the heart of policy to improve resilience 
and in turn demands a very broad brush policy approach to service the 
very special needs of small states. 
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Appendixl 
Small States' Population and Gross National Income Per Capita 
Country Population GNI Country Population GNI 
('000) per cap. ('000) per cap. 
us 2006 us 2006 
Guinea Bissau 1540 190 Bahamas 319 15100 
Gambia 1478 310 Iceland 290 50580 
Gabon 1362 5000 Belize 283 3650 
Estonia 1349 11410 Barbados 269 8670 
Trinidad & Tobago 1301 13340 Vanuatu 207 1710 
Mauritius 1234 5450 Samoa 184 2270 
Swaziland 1120 2430 St Lucia 164 5110 
Timor Leste 925 840 Sao Tome & Principe 153 780 
Bhutan 896 1410 St Vincent 118 3930 
Fiji Islands 841 3300 Micronesia 110 2380 
Cyprus 826 18430 Grenada 106 4420 
Djibouti 779 1060 Tonga 102 2170 
Qatar 777 12000 Kiribati 98 1230 
Guyana 750 1130 Seychelles 84 8650 
Bahrain 716 14370 Antigua & Barbuda 80 11210 
Montenegro 685 3860 Andorra 71 24000 
Comoros 588 660 Dominica 71 3960 
Cape Verde 495 2130 Marshall Islands 61 3000 
Equatorial Guinea 492 8250 St Kitts & Nevis 47 8840 
Solomon Islands 490 680 Monaco 34 27000 
Luxembourg 453 76040 Liechtenstein 34 25000 
Suriname 446 3200 San Marino 28 34600 
Malta 401 13610 Palau 20 7990 
Brunei 366 24100 Nauru 13 5000 
Maldives 321 2680 Tuvalu 11 1100 
Sources: World Bank Atlas and CIA Fact Book (latest available figures). 
Appendix2 
Governance Indicators for 2006 
Country VA PI GE RQ RL COR 
Guinea Bissau 33.7 26.4 11.4 15.6 9.0 15.5 
Gambia 23.6 53.4 26.1 39.5 47.6 30.6 
Gabon 22.1 48.6 30.8 33.2 34.8 20.9 
Estonia 78.8 71.2 85.3 92.2 80.5 80.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 62.0 41.3 63.5 71.2 48.1 54.9 
Mauritius 75.0 79.3 71.6 67.3 75.7 66.5 
Swaziland 15.9 42.3 27.0 10 7 7.86 40.:1 
TimorLeste 38.5 16.8 26.5 6.8 11.4 19.9 
Bhutan 22.6 95.2 65.9 47.3 68.1 80.6 
Fiji Islands 34.6 50.5 52.6 39.0 51.9 45.6 
See next page for legend of column headings and more data 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
VA PI GE RL COR 
Cyprus 86.1 60.6 87.2 86.8 81.9 79.1 
Djibouti 21.2 39.4 15.6 18.5 25.2 28.6 
Qatar 31.7 77.9 70.1 64.9 81.4 78.6 
Guyana 50.5 26.9 51.7 32.2 27.6 32.0 
Bahrain 27.4 32.2 66.4 71.7 66.7 71.4 
Montenegro 47.1 51.4 48.8 37.6 38.6 39.8 
Comoros 40.9 41.8 0.9 5.4 18.6 34.5 
Cape Verde 74.5 78.8 61.l 45.4 66.2 72.8 
Equatorial Guinea 3.4 40.9 7.6 8.3 9.5 1.5 
Solomon Islands 51.9 51.0 18.0 13.2 20.0 49.0 
Luxembourg 97.6 99.5 93.4 98.5 95.7 95.6 
Suriname 56.3 49.0 54.5 41.0 49.5 52.4 
Malta 89.9 92.3 86.3 86.3 91.4 84.5 
Brunei 17.3 92.8 72.0 80.0 59.5 63.6 
Maldives 20.2 72.1 56.9 59.5 58.1 39.3 
Bahamas 79.3 80.8 84.8 83.9 88.6 90.8 
Iceland 95.2 100 99.1 95.1 100 99.5 
Belize 66.3 47.1 49.8 45.9 52.4 48.1 
Barbados 85.l 84.l 86.7 76.6 83.3 85.0 
Vanuatu 63.5 96.2 40.3 49.3 62.9 62.6 
Samoa 64.4 88.5 57.8 53.2 81.0 63.1 
St Lucia 89.4 81.3 79.6 84.4 76.2 83 
Sao Tome & Principe 55.3 63.9 20.9 22.4 42.4 38.8 
St Vincent 79.8 84.6 78.7 77.1 76.2 81.6 
Micronesia 80.8 85.6 47.9 56.6 69.5 50.0 
Grenada 69.7 62.5 61.6 64.4 56.2 71.8 
Tonga 46.2 66.3 29.9 22.0 64.3 5.3 
Kiribati 63.0 96.2 35.5 17.1 77.6 59.2 
Seychelles 54.3 83.7 53.1 26.3 54.8 60.7 
Antigua & Barbuda 65.9 74.5 67.8 67.8 82.4 85.4 
Andorra 91.8 96.2 90.0 88.3 88.1 85.4 
Dominica 77.9 72.6 75.8 77.1 68.6 73.3 
Marshall Islands 88.0 86.1 13.7 18.0 49.0 38.3 
St Kitts & Nevis 85.6 94.2 77.7 80.5 76.2 81.6 
Monaco 71.6 83.2 66.8 n/a 70.5 n/a 
Liechtenstein 91.3 96.2 94.3 88.3 89.0 85.4 
San Marino 88.0 86.1 46.9 n/a 70.5 n/a 
Palau 88.9 86.1 31.8 n/a 70.5 n/a 
Nauru 81.7 86.1 9.0 n/a 70.5 n/a 
Tuvalu 71.2 96.2 45.5 21.5 83.8 56.3 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007) 
Column2 Voice and Accountability (VA) 
Column3 Political Instability and Absence of Violence (PI) 
Columntl Government Effectiveness (GE) 
Columns Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
Column 6 Rule of Law (RL) 
Column7 Control of Corruption (COR) 
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